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1.  Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse – by applying a rank dependent 
expected utility model
1 – the effect on tax evasion of changes in the probability and 
severity of punishment, and also of changes in income and tax rates. There are several 
reasons for doing this. (i) The expected utility (EU) model, still dominant in economic 
analysis of uncertainty, has been seriously challenged in a number of studies, and it is 
therefore reasonable to explore the characteristics of non-expected utility models in 
various fields. (ii) The situation of a potential tax evader is in some ways similar to 
situations in laboratory experiments where the expected utility model has performed 
badly. (iii) The rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) model seems to be the best 
among the non-expected utility models as far as sharp comparative statics results are 
concerned.  
In section 2 some of the relevant properties of the RDEU theory are presented, 
followed in section 3 by a discussion of certain issues in modelling tax evasion. The 
formal structure of a RDEU model of tax evasion is given in section 4. Section 5 
examines the comparative statics of a RDEU portfolio choice m odel, whereas the 
special case of a dual model is analysed in section 6. 
 
2.  RDEU vs EU 
The flourishing field of generalized expected utility theory has provided 
explanations of several phenomena that appear as paradoxes within the theory of 
expected utility.
2 Several of these phenomena seem to be related to the fact that 
marginal utility of wealth and attitude towards risk is merged in the expected utility 
model. This amalgamation makes the EU model particularly simple and tractable, but 
                                                 
1 The model is also known as anticipated utility (AU), expected utility with rank-dependent preferences 
(EURDP), the m-qmodel, the dual theory of choice under uncertainty, and rank-dependent utility (RDU). 
The many names indicate that authors dealing with different problems have come up with essentially the 
same model. 
2 Quiggin (1993, 37-49) gives an overview of the many challenges to EU theory, i.a. the Allais paradox, 
the Ellsberg paradox, preference reversal, insurance and gambling jointly, and difficulties in empirical 
constructions of utility functions. He also (49-32) discusses, and challenges, some attempts to solve the 
various problems by introducing weighting of probabilities, in particular the prospect theory. Attempts 
to model this phenomenon by transforming probabilities have not been successful (Quiggin 1993, p. 63).  
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at the same time hampers a more profound study of the individual’s attitude towards 
uncertainty. The EU concept of risk aversion is partly a property of attitudes to wealth, 
and not of attitudes to risk per se.  By keeping the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function, and at the same time allowing for transformations of probabilities, the RDEU 
model generalises the EU model.  
Ellsberg (1961) provided an early demonstration of the importance of ambiguity 
in decision making, and showed that uncertainty is not totally captured by the concept 
of probability. Ambiguity is an intermediate state between ignorance, in which no 
distributions can be ruled out, and risk, in which all but one distribution is ruled out. 
Ambiguity results from the decision maker having limited or vague information and 
knowledge of the process generating outcomes.
3 Empirical evidence indicates that 
people distinguish between risk and ambiguity.
4 In a situation of risk the decision 
maker has objective or subjective probabilities of given outcomes. In a situation of 
ignorance the decision maker has no information concerning the likelihood of potential 
outcomes. Studies show that ambiguity aversion and risk aversion are not (highly) 
correlated, a correlation one would expect if they were just different designations of 
the same phenomena.
5 Both ambiguity avoidance and ambiguity-seeking behaviour 
have been found in laboratory experiments.
6 
EU theory can neither explain the Ellsberg paradox nor some other phenomena 
obtained in various experiments. The theory does not capture important factors that 
characterise risky decision making: (i) The context in which the decision is taken can  
                                                 
3 Ellsberg (1961, 657) defined ambiguity as “a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability and 
“unanimity” of information, giving rise to one’s degree of “confidence” in an estimate of relative 
“likelihoods” of future events. 
4 Camerer (1999). 
5 Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1985), Hogharth and Einhorn (1990), and Schoemaker (1982). 
6 See i.a. Becker and Brownson (1964), Yates and Zukowski (1976) and Einhorn and Hogarth (1986). 
Surveying several experimental studies Edwards (1992, p. 5) makes the following comment: “Currim 
and Sarin (1989, 1990) compared experimental subjects’ assessed expected utility models with their 
prospect theory, weighted utility, and lottery dependent utility models; and Daniels and Keller  (1990) 
assessed expected utility and lottery dependent models. Overall, expected utility did about as well as 
generalised utility models in predicting choices on a hold-out sample of paired comparison choices, even 
when the problems were structured to induce expected utility property violations. However, the potential 
for improved predictive performance by generalised expected utility models may still be achieved. For 
ex ample, Daniels and Keller (1992) have explored a choice-based assessment mechanism in which lottery 
dependent expected utility appears to perform better than expected utility. Also, Shafir et al. (1989) 
proposed an advantage model of choice that outperformed two special cases of expected utility”.  
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change the evaluation of risk; (ii) the character of the uncertainty that people encounter 
in real-world situations is different from the risk encountered in gambling; and (iii) the 
payoffs can affect the weights given to uncertainty. 
In this paper the rank-dependent expected utility  theory will be applied to study 
to what extent the comparative statics results obtained by use of the EU model carry 
over to the RDEU model.
7 Among the host of non-expected utility models with 
different preference functionals that have been proposed in order to tackle various 
theoretical and empirical problems raised in studies of individual behaviour under 
uncertainty, the RDEU model is chosen for various reasons
8. According to Quiggin 
(1993, p. 72) relation (1) and (2) below is the only possible generalisation of the EU 
theory that is separable in outcomes and probabilities, and in which the requirements of 
first stochastic dominance, transistivity and continuity are satisfied.
9 Separability 
makes the model simple, and is crucial  for some of the sharp comparative statics 
results of this theory. It also performs quite well in experiments where various utility 
theories have been compared.
10  
As shown by Quiggin (1993, p. 92) the RDEU model is able to accommodate for 
a majority of the observed violations of EU predictions, while retaining enough 
structure to preserve the standard comparative statics results. He also asserts (p. 93) 
                                                 
7 Quiggin (1993) has given the most comprehensive treatment of the RDEU model. The present paper 
can be seen as a response to his suggestion of investigating to what extent the many nice results obtained 
in various fields by assuming EU carry over to RDEU models. Another paper responding to his 
suggestion is Eide (1995). 
8Different types of models have been developed to explain and predict behaviour under ambiguity. 
These include (i) models based on the idea of anchor probability (Einhorn and Hogarth (1986)), models 
which represent ambiguity as a second order probability (Marshak (1975) and Bernasconi (1997)), and 
models in which the probability of events is not additive (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). The present 
paper is an example of the latter. Prospect theory has also been developed in order to accommodate such 
characteristics, but this theory, at variance with ambiguity theory, concerns gambles with well-defined 
probabilities. 
9 E.g. the theory of Honda (1977) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) violate dominance requirements. 
10 Hey and Orme (1994) conclude such an investigation thus (p. 1321): “Expected utility theory (and its 
special case risk neutrality) emerges from this analysis fairly intact. For possibly 39% of the subjects … 
EU appears to fit no worse than any of the other models … For the 61% of the subjects, one or more of 
the eight “top-level” functionals … fits significantly better in statistical terms, though often the 
economic significance is not all that great. Of the eight “top-level” functionals it would appear that the 
two rank dependent functionals and the quadratic utility model emerge as strongest contenders (with the 
Quiggin weighting function having a modest lead over its power weighting rival).” Harless and 
Carmerer (1994), using as much as 23 data sets, conclude, however, that our choice of preference 
functionals must depend on the researchers’ preference for fit and parsimony. No functional is to be 
preferred on both accounts.  
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that the comparative statics results do not depend on the special assumptions of the EU 
theory. 
Whereas risk aversion in the EU theory corresponds to a simple condition on the 
utility function, the RDEU model implies a fundamental distinction between attitudes 
to probabilities and attitudes to outcomes, cfr. Quiggin (1993, p. 76): 
First there is outcome risk aversion, associated with the idea that marginal utility 
of wealth is declining. This is the standard notion of risk aversion from EU theory 
defined by concavity of the utility function. Second, there are attitudes specific to 
probability preferences.
11 An obvious ground for risk aversion in probability weighting 
arises for people characterized by pessimism, that is, those who adopt a set of decision 
weights that yields an expected value for a transformed risky prospect lower than the 
mathematical expectation. This yields a natural generalization of the basic definition or 
risk aversion to the RDEU model.  
It is worth noticing that Allais (1988) in his axiomatisation of the main ideas in 
his 1953 article comes up with the RDEU model. Discussing the independent works of 
Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987) and Segal (1987) he states: “It is very significant that, 
starting from entirely different premises, all three authors have been led to a 
mathematical formulation that is analogous to my own” (emphasis in original). 
It is also interesting to note that Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989) 
independently seem to have discovered the RDEU model in studies of ambiguity, i.e. 
in studies where objective probabilities are absent. Here, the decision weights are 
interpreted as non-additive subjective probabilities. In the standard RDEU model 
developed by Quiggin (1993) objective probabilities are assumed to be known, and 
these are transformed into non-additive decision weights.
12  
                                                 
11 It is arguable that the term ‘risk aversion’ is more properly applied to preferences over probabilities 
than to preferences over outcomes. [Quiggins footnote] 
12 Quiggin argues that the difference in interpretation could be seen as only a difference in authors’ 
tastes.  
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3.  Issues in modelling tax evasion 
According to Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) portfolio choice approach to 
income tax evasion
13, a risk-averse taxpayer, with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function, will under-report his income whenever the expected  gain minus expected 
punishment of evasion is positive. Intuition as well as empirical evidence seems to 
contradict this conclusion. For the more common types of tax evasion the sanctions in 
many countries consist of fines less (or not much higher) than the amount evaded, 
whereas the probabilities of tax returns being audited are of the order of a few percent. 
In general one would therefore expect most individuals to be tax evaders, a result that 
is not supported by empirical evidence,  - quite a few seem to comply. Some 
explanations of why people are more law abiding than perhaps expected are related to 
social norms, stigma, or moral sentiments. In this paper another explanation is 
considered: Behaviour is in accordance with the theory of rank dependent expected 
utility. 
Using a result by Segal and Spivak (1990), Bernasconi (1998) presents a related 
explanation. Assuming that the preference functional is not differentiable near certainty 
(no tax evasion), Bernasconi finds that individuals sometimes prefer not to cheat even 
when the expected return of evasion is positive. The approach accommodates for a 
high degree of risk aversion near the certainty point. Bernasconi’s result presupposes 
the use of non-expected utility models. He demonstrates that not all such models can 
be used to solve the apparent puzzle of tax compliance. The RDEU model, however, 
has the appropriate characteristics. The present exploration of the RDEU model can be 
considered as a supplement to Bernasconi’s article. 
Some of the problems appearing as paradoxes within the EU theory (in particular 
those of Allais and Ellsberg) seem to be related to low probability events. Since the 
probabilities of being audited are quite low in many countries, one might expect the 
RDEU model to have a better chance than the EU model to represent the behaviour of 
the tax payers. Furthermore, the probability of being sanctioned can only vaguely be 
known by the tax payer, a situation of ambiguity that calls for an RDEU representation.  
                                                 
13 For summaries of the literature on tax evasion see Erhard and Feinstein (1994), Franzoni (2000) or 
Eide (2000).   
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Alm (1988) and Beck and Jung (1989) have extended previous tax compliance 
research by developing models in which taxpayers are uncertain of their taxable 
incomes and associated tax liabilities (due to such things as the complexity of the tax 
law and the uncertainty of audit outcomes). Alm (1988) found that increased 
uncertainty had a substantial impact on a number of taxpayers’ decisions including 
investing in tax shelters, receiving compensation in wage or non-wage forms, spending 
on tax deductible items, and under-reporting one’s income. Beck and Jung (1989) 
concluded that the effects of uncertainty on taxpayer compliance can differ depending 
on risk-taking attitudes, the likelihood of audit and the magnitude of penalties. When 
the magnitude of penalties and the perceived likelihood of audit are high, increasing 
uncertainty increases compliance regardless whether taxpayers are risk-averse or risk-
neutral. However, when audit probabilities and penalty rates are low (and closer to the 
values that would be expected to occur naturally), risk-neutral taxpayers are shown to 
have incentives to reduce compliance. For risk-averse taxpayers, the effects of 
increasing uncertainty depend on the degree of risk aversion.
14 
These results encourage exploring RDEU models of tax evasion. 
 
4.  The RDEU model 
In presenting the rank dependent expected utility model I follow Quiggin (1993, 
p. 57) and his notation. Let x be a vector of n outcomes with the probability vector p, 
and U(x) a primitive utility function. The characteristic feature of this model is a 
probability weighting function q:[0,1]ﬁ[0,1], which is applied, not to the probabilities 
of individual events, but to the cumulative distribution function  F(x). The RDEU 
functional to be maximised is 
 




                                                 
14 See Sawyers (1990) for a survey of results in this field.  
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That is, q defines the weight on the worst outcome (unsuccessful evasion) and 1-
q defines the weight on the better outcome (successful evasion). 
 
5.  An RDEU  portfolio choice model of tax evasion 
Consider a tax payer with exogenous income W0, unknown to the tax authorities. 
Declared income X, which is the taxpayer’s decision variable, is taxed by a flat rate q. 
The probability that the tax authority becomes aware of evasion is P. If evasion is 
disclosed, the taxpayer will be punished in proportion to the tax evaded. Evaded tax is 
q(W0-X), and the additional payment is pq(W0-X), where p (>1) may be called the 
penalty rate. We assume that the individual’s utility of income can be represented by a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(W) with U’>0 and U’’<0.  The RDEU 
functional to be maximised is then 
 





) ( 0 0 X W X W WU - - - = pq q               (3) 
 
is income if tax evasion is unsuccessful (from the taxpayer’s point of view), and 
 
X W WS q - = 0                   (4)  
   
   
9
 
is income if tax evasion is successful. 
Derivation w.r.t. X gives the 1. order necessary condition for maximum: 
 
0 )) ( 1 )( ( ' ) ( ) ( ' = - - P q W U P q W U S U p          (5) 
 
The 2. order condition for maximum: 
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X
V
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¶
¶
p q <0 
 
is satisfied, and (5) then determines the optimal value of declared income, X 
*. 
The taxpayer’s reactions to changes in the parameters are found by differentiation of 
(5), see appendix.  
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This qualitative result is the same as that obtained by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) in their expected utility model. The quantitative effect depends of course on the 
probability weighting function.  
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Assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, R A(WU) > R A(WS). The bracket is 
then definitely negative only if pq ‡ 1. Only in that case can we be certain that our  
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taxpayer will increase declared income when exogenous income increases. This 
qualitative result is also the same as that obtained by Allingham and Sandmo. 
The effect on the proportion of income declared by an exogenous change in 
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It is seen that when exogenous income increases, the proportion of income 
declared increases, stays constant, or decreases according to whether relative risk 
aversion is an increasing, constant or decreasing function of income. The same 
qualitative conclusion was obtained by Allingham and Sandmo.  
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Both elements in the bracket are positive, and an increase in the penalty rate 
increases the amount of income declared. Allingham and Sandmo obtained the same 
result. 
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which shows that when decreasing absolute risk aversion is assumed, our 
taxpayer will declare more of the income if the flat tax rate is increased. This result is 
the same as obtained by Yitzhaki (1974). The conclusion in Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) is less sharp, because they, at variance with both Yitzhaki’s and the present  
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model, assumed that the penalty was proportional to the income evaded (and not the 
tax evaded). 
 
6.  The dual model 
The EU model and the dual model of Yaari (1987) are special cases of the RDEU 
model. The EU model is linear in the probabilities, whereas the dual model is linear in 
the preferences. According to the dual model individuals maximize an expected value 
with weighting of probabilities. This model might be more relevant for firms than for 
individuals. For our tax evasion problem the preference functional to be maximized is 
 
X P q W P q P q W P q W Z S U ) 1 ) ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( 0 - + - = - + = p pq , 
 
which shows that 
X=W0   if pq(P)>1  (full compliance) 
X=0      if pq(P)<1  (no declaration)   
X is undetermined if pq(P)=1. 
An exogenous increase in either sanction rate or in the probability of punishment 
will eventually change the taxpayer’s behaviour from no declaration to full 
compliance. Changes in exogenous income or tax rate will not change the taxpayer’s 
attitude to compliance.    
 
7.  Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that the comparative statics results of the portfolio 
choice model of tax evasion carry over to a related rank dependent expected utility 
model. The generalisation of expected utility to rank dependent expected utility has not 
changed the qualitative results obtained by Allingham/Sandmo/Yitzhaki. The same is 
true for the dual model. The quantitative effects depend of course on the weighting 
function. 
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Appendix  
The taxpayer’s reaction to changes in the parameters is found by differentiation 
of the 1. order condition (5) for obtaining a maximum value of the preference 
functional: 
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Substitution from (3) gives 
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